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WHEN AUTHORS WON'T SELL: PARODY, 
FAIR USE, AND EFFICIENCY IN 
COPYRIGHT LAW 
ALFRED C. YEN· 
I. INTRODUCTION 
This article considers whether the fair use treatment of parodyl in 
copyright law2 is economically efficient. 3 The inquiry is undertaken 
• B.S., M.S., Stanford University; 1.0. Harvard Law School. Assistant Professor of Law, Boston 
College Law School. The author would like to thank Frank Upham, Ralph Brown, Wendy Gordon 
and Dave Sunding for their comments. Thanks are also owed to Tracy Tanaka and Kelly Cournoyer 
for their able research assistance. This article was made possible by the author's receipt of a Dr. 
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Expense Grant from Boston College. Copyright 1990 by Alfred C. Yen. All rights reserved. 
\. This article uses the term "parody" to encompass any humorous expression that is based on a 
preexisting work of authorship. By defining "parody" in such broad terms, the article includes works 
which might more accurately be considered satires, burlesques, or travesties. This is done to follow the 
courts' practice of treating these varied, but related, art forms as "parodies" under the copyright law. 
See Loew's Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 131 F. Supp. 165, 176 n.31 (S.D. Cal. 1955), ajf'd sub 
nom. Benny v. Loew's Inc., 239 F.2d 532 (9th Cir. 1956), aff'd by an equally divided court sub nom. 
Columbia Broadcasting Sys. v. Loew's, Inc., 356 U.S. 43 (1958) ("It will be noted that the words 
'burlesque', 'parody', 'satire' and 'travesty' are often used interchangeably."). For discussions of par-
ody and other humorous art forms, see PARODIES: AN ANTHOLOGY FROM CHAUCER TO BEERBOHM-
AND AFTER 557-68 (D. MacDonald ed. 1960) (defining parody and setting forth a brief history); M. 
ROSE, PARODy//META-FICTION: AN ANALYSIS OF PARODY AS A CRmCAL MIRROR TO THE WRIT-
ING AND RECEPTION OF FICTION 17-55 (1979) (defining parody and distinguishing it from related 
forms of art). For brief introductions to the relationship between parody and copyright, see Goetsch, 
Parody as Free Speech-The Replacement of the Fair Use Doctrine by First Amendment Protection, 3 W. 
NEW ENG. L. REV. 39, 39-42 (1980); Netterville, Copyright and Tort Aspects of Parody, Mimicry and 
Humorous Commentary, 35 S. CAL. L. REv. 225, 225-29 (1962). 
2. Copyright law gives the author, among other things, exclusive rights to the preparation of 
works which are based on her original material. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1988). Under this scheme, parodists 
would normally have to obtain permission from the author of any work they wanted to parody. Gold-
stein, Derivative Rights and Derivative Works in Copyright, 301. CoPYRIGHT Soc'y 209, 234 (1983) 
("Parodies and satires represent derivative uses no less than dramatizations, abridgments or other ar-
rangements of the underlying work."). See also Benny v. Loew's Inc., 239 F.2d 532 (9th Cir. 1956) 
(holding parodist liable for violation of copyright holder's exclusive rights), aff'd by an equally divided 
court sub nom. Columbia Broadcasting Sys. v. Loew's, Inc., 356 U.S. 43 (1958). However, the courts 
have frequently excused the otherwise infringing actions of the parodist under the so-called fair use 
doctrine. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1988) (codification of the fair use doctrine); Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d 
432 (9th Cir. 1986); Elsmere Music, Inc., v. National Broadcasting Co., 482 F. Supp. 741 (S.D. N.Y.), 
aff'd, 623 F.2d 252 (2d Cir. 1980); Berlin v. E.C. Publications, Inc., 329 F.2d 541, 545 (2d Cir.) ("For, 
as a general proposition, we believe that parody and satire are deserving of substantial freedom .... ") 
(emphasis in original), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 822 (1964). For further discussion of the fair use doctrine, 
see infra notes 49-53 and accompanying text. 
3. Efficiency theorists generally refer to two different, but related, concepts of efficiency. The first 
concept, Pareto efficiency, describes a state of affairs in which no person can be made better off without 
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because it provides a good illustration of how the failure of econo-
mists' assumptions prevents efficiency theorists from completely ex-
plaining the results of traditional copyright intuition.4 Awareness of 
this phenomenon is important in light of the rising popularity of 
efficiency theories in copyright. S and it also sheds light on the future of 
infticting a loss on at least one other person. 1. CoLEMAN, MARKETS, MORALS AND THE LAW 97-98 
(1988). The second concept, Kaldor-Hicks efficiency, describes a state of affairs in which some individ-
ual has been made better off by a redistribution, to a point where he could hypothetically fully compen-
sate those whose condition was worsened, with a net gain in welfare. Id. at 98. For further discussion 
of these concepts and their relation to copyright, see infra notes 80-103 and accompanying text. 
4. Cf. Cooter, Book Review, Law and the Imperialism of Economics: An Introduction to the ~ 
nomic Analysis of Law and a Review of the Major Books, 29 UCLA L. REv. 1260, 1264-65 (1982) 
(contrasting deductive nature of economic reaaoning with inductive nature of traditional legal 
reasoning). 
5. See. e.g .• Landes & Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, 181. LEGAL STUD. 325 
(1989) (presenting a mathematically oriented efficiency model of major copyright doctrines); Gordon, 
Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic Analysis of the Betamax Case and its Predeces-
sors, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1600 (1982) (presenting efficiency based model of the fair use doctrine); 
Menell, An Analysis of the Scope of Copyright Protection for Application Programs, 41 STAN. L. REv. 
1045 (1989) (analyzing extent of copyright protection for computer programs under an efficiency analy-
sis); Fisher, Reconstructing the Fair Use Doctrine, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1659 (1988) (using efficiency to 
shape fair use doctrine). The rising importance of efficiency as a copyright norm can also be seen in a 
recently published treatise by a leading copyright scholar, Professor Paul Goldstein. P. GoLDSTEIN, 
CoPYRIGHT: PRINCIPLES, LAW AND PRACTICE (1989). Although Professor Goldstein does not explain 
all of copyright in efficiency terms, efficiency certainly plays a major role in many key areas of his work, 
particularly in his discussion of fair use. Id. at 194-95 (describing the major approaches to fair use as 
solutions to the problem of transaction costs). 
The popularity of efficiency analysis should come as no surprise. The Constitution grants Con-
gress the power "[ t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to 
Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries." U.S. CoNST. 
art. I, § 8, cl. 8. Courts generally construe this clause as evidence that copyright rests on a strictly 
economic foundation. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984); 
Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954). See also Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study of 
Copyright in Books, Photocopies, and Computer Programs, 84 HARV. L. REv. 281, 284-91 (1970) (argu-
ing that economics is the only defensible basis for copyright law). 
However, this impressive array of opinion has not eliminated other theories of copyright. Some 
analysts have claimed that natural rights theory provides copyright's true theoretical basis. Kauffman, 
Exposing the Suspicious Foundation of Society's Primacy in Copyright Law: Five Accidents, 10 COLUM. 
I.L. & ARTS 381 (1986). Others have argued convincingly that economics alone provides an incom-
plete basis for copyright law. See Gordon, An Inquiry into the Merits of Copyright: The Challenges of 
Consistency. Consent and Encouragement Theory, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1343, 1351 (arguing that" 'wealth 
maximization,' as an aggregative criterion that disregards the possibility of independently derived indi-
vidual rights, cannot serve as an acceptable foundation for the initial assignment of entitlements."); 
Yen, Restoring the Natural Law: Copyright as Labor and Possession, 51 OHIO ST. L.l. 517 (1990) (point-
ing out indeterminacy of economic principles and apparent presence of natural law reaaoning in copy-
right). This dissatisfaction with a solely economic copyright theory is further reflected in recent 
explanations of copyright which draw little inspiration from economic reaaoning. See Litman, The 
Public Domain, 39 EMORY L.l. 965 (1990); Hughes, The Philosophy of Intellectual Property, 77 GEO. 
L.l. 287 (1988). See also Brown, Eligibility for Copyright Protection: A Search for Principled Standards, 
70 MINN. L. REV. 579 (1985) (advocating the combination of economic and authors' rights ap-
proaches). In light of these arguments, this article bases its analysis in economics for the purpose of 
inquiry, and not as an endorsement of the view that copyright analysis should be conducted solely as a 
matter of economics. For further criticism of efficiency analysis, see infra note 102. 
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copyright analysis.6 
Courts have traditionally viewed copyright as an instrument for 
encouraging creative activity. 7 By giving authors the ability to prevent 
others from reproducing, distributing, performing, displaying, or bas-
ing new works on original material,8 copyright creates a property right 
which authors may exploit commercially.9 The possibility of realizing 
such financial gains gives authors incentives to create new works from 
which the public may benefit. 10 
Of course, granting these benefits is not without costs, for the cre-
ation of new works is heavily dependent on the ability of new authors 
to borrow from already existing materials. 11 If copyright law out-
lawed all borrowing from existing works, the creative process would 
surely grind to a halt, thereby depriving the public of the very benefits 
copyright should secure. Copyright law therefore limits the duration 
of an author's copyright12 and allows a significant degree of borrowing 
from .every work even while copyright subsists. 13 
6. See infra notes 146-147 and accompanying text. 
7. See supra note 5. 
8. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1988) (extending copyright protection to "original works of authorship"); 17 
U.S.C. § 106 (defining five exclusive rights of copyright holders). 
9. Cf. Calabresi & Melamed, Property Rules. Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the 
Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REv. 1089, 1092 (1972): 
An entitlement is protected by a property rule to the extent that someone who wishes to 
remove the entitlement from its holder must buy it from him in a voluntary transaction in 
which the value of the entitlement is agreed upon by the seller. 
10. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984): 
The monopoly privileges that Congress may authorize are neither unlimited nor primarily 
designed to provide a special private benefit. Rather, the limited grant is a means by which 
an important public purpose may be achieved. It is intended to motivate the creative activ-
ity of authors and inventors by the provision of a special reward, and to allow the public 
access to the products of their genius after the limited period of exclusive control has 
expired. 
See also THE FEDERALIST No. 43, at 279 (1. Madison) (E.M. Earle ed. 1976) ("[t]he utility of [the 
copyright] power will scarcely be questioned .. " The public good fully coincides in both cases with the 
claims of individuals"). 
11. See Emerson v. Davies, 8 F. Cas. 615, 619 (C.C.D. Mass. 1845) (No. 4,436): 
In truth, in literature, in science and in art, there are, and can be, few, if any, things, which, 
in an abstract sense, are strictly new and original throughout. Every book in literature, 
science and art, borrows, and must necessarily borrow, and use much which was well 
known and used before. . .. No man writes exclusively from his own thoughts, unaided and 
uninstructed by the thoughts of others. The thoughts of every man are, more or less, a 
combination of what other men have thought and expresSed, although they may be modi-
fied, exalted, or improved by his own genius or reflection. 
See also Litman, supra note 5, at 1007-13; Landes & Posner, supra note 5, at 332. 
12. 17 U.S.C. § 302 (1988) (generally limiting duration of copyright to the life of the author plus 
fifty years). 
13. Three major doctrines accomplish this result. The most prominent doctrine is the idea/ex-
pression dichotomy, which expressly withholds copyright protection from the ideas contained in every 
work. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b); Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1880); Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 
F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1930), cert. denied, 282 U.S. 902 (1931). The useful article doctrine works in a 
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This basic structure often leads courts to determine the extent of 
an author's copyright rights by engaging in an intuitive cost-benefit 
analysis. Courts ask whether, on balance, granting the author's claim 
will foster more creativity than it hinders. 14 Judicial intuition neces-
sarily plays a strong role in this calculation because courts seldom 
have hard evidence about either the quantity or quality of the creative 
activity that copyright fosters. IS 
In general, this intuitive cost-benefit analysis does a reasonable 
job of explaining the basic shape of copyright law. After all, most 
people would agree that the public is better off with some sort of copy-
right law than with none at al1. 16 Most would also' agree that doc-
trines that limit copyright's reach are necessary to keep copyright 
from choking the very creativity it should foster.1 7 However, when it 
comes to copyright's details, the clarity of intuitive cost-benefit reason-
ing declines. It is difficult, if not impossible, to reach firm conclusions 
about whether copyright should prevent individuals from copying the 
structure of computer programs,I8 imitating an author's style,I9 or 
similar fashion by denying copyright protection to utilitarian aspects of copyright works. See Esquire, 
Inc. v. Ringer, 591 F.2d 796 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cen. denied, 440 U.S. 908 (1979) (denying copyright to 
overall design of lighting fixture); Carol Barnhart, Inc. v. Economy Cover Corp., 773 F.2d 411 (2d Cir. 
1985) (denying protection to mannequins used to display clothing). Lastly, the fair use doctrine oper-
ates by excusing otherwise infringing activity when a finding of infringement would be inequitable or 
inconsistent with the general purposes of copyright. 17 U.S.C. § 107. For further discussion of the fair 
use doctrine, see infra notes 49-53 and accompanying text. 
14. Whelan Assocs., Inc. v.laslow Dental Laboratory, Inc., 797 F.2d 1222, 1235 (3rd Cir. 1986), 
cen. denied, 479 U.S. 1031 (1987), clearly states this view: 
[p]recisely because the line between idea and expression is elusive, we must pay particular 
attention to the pragmatic considerations that underlie the distinction and copyright law 
generally. In this regard, we must remember that the purpose of the copyright law is to 
create the most efficient and productive balance between protection (incentive) and dissemi-
nation of information, to promote learning, culture and development. 
See also MeneH, supra note 5, at 1065. 
IS. See Litman, supra note 5, at 998. Concrete information about the amount and kind of works 
which best serve the public interests are even harder to come by. 
16. But see Breyer, supra note 5 (raising doubt about value of copyright). 
17. See Litman, supra note 5, at 1015-23; M. NIMMER & D. NIMMER, NIMMER ON CoPYRIGHT 
§ 13.05 (3d ed. 1989) (stating that fair use doctrine "permits courts to avoid rigid application of the 
copyright statute when, on occasion, it would stifle the very creativity that law is designed to foster"). 
18. Compare Whelan Assocs., 797 F.2d at 1222 (extending copyright protection to sequence 
structure and organization of computer programs) with Plains Cotton Coop. Ass'n v. Goodpasture 
Computer Serv., Inc., 807 F.2d 1256 (5th CiT.), cen. denied, 484 U.S. 821 (1987) (dec1ining to adopt 
Whelan). 
19. Compare Roth Greeting Cards v. United Card Co., 429 F.2d 1106 (9th CiT. 1970) (basing 
infringement on general appearance and style of greeting cards) with Aliotti v. R. Dakin & Co., 831 
F.2d 898 (9th Cir. 1987) (dec1ining to find copyright infringement despite general similarity in appear-
ance between stuffed dinosaur toys). For further discussion of the doctrinal and constitutional issues 
raised by these cases and copyright's general ambiguity, see Yen, A First Amendment Perspective on the 
Idea/Expression Dichotomy and Copyright in a Works "Towl Concept and Feel. " 38 EMORY L.l. 393 
(1989). 
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videotaping television programs off of the air.20 These problems arise, 
at least in part, because courts have neither articulated a firm vision of 
the public welfare nor devised a method for maximizing it. Instead, 
we are left with a collection of results in search of truly coherent 
principles. 
This problem explains the growing use of economic efficiency in 
copyright,21 for efficiency theory provides both a definition of the pub-
lic welfare and an unambiguous method for improving it. As an initial 
matter, the efficiency theorist defines the public welfare in terms of a 
single variable, usually money.22 This leads quickly to a method for 
improving and maximizing public welfare. Since dollars are quantifi-
able and measurable, the optimal copyright regime may be expressed 
as that regime which maximizes the amount by which copyright's ben-
efits exceed its costs. 23 
The prospect of applying efficiency to copyright is tempting in-
deed. If efficiency'S deduction could somehow replace copyright's in-
tuition, copyright would take on an intellectual rigor rarely seen in 
law. Empirical cost-benefit calculations would identify improvements 
to copyright law. Instead of making ad hOC intuitive judgments about 
how much copyright best serves the public interest, copyright analysts 
could deductively prove that a given copyright doctrine actually maxi-
mizes society'S welfare.24 When combined with copyright's undenia-
ble link to economics, these possibilities create pressure to immediately 
adopt efficiency as copyright's primary analytical tool. 2' 
However, brief reflection reveals that this adoption should not 
20. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 454-56 (1984) (504 decision 
declaring the off air videorecording of television programs for timeshifting purposes a fair use). 
2 t. For examples, see supra note 5. 
22. See Posner, Utilitarillnism. Economics. and Legal Theory, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. \03, 119 (1979) 
(measuring welfare as "the value in dollars or dollar equivalents ... of everything in society"). As a 
theoretical matter, economists could use a measure other than money to measure welfare. However, 
the practical necessity of measuring and comparing the value of disparate interests makes money a 
particularly attractive measure of welfare. See also infra note 96 and accompanying text. 
23. Landes & Posner, supra note 5, at 326. See infra notes 98-102 and accompanying text for 
discussion of how this process of maximization might be accomplished. 
24. Cf Cooter, supra note 4, at 1264-65 (referring to deductive mathematical proof); Landes & 
Posner, supra note 5, at 341042 (providing mathematical expression of copyright regime which maxi-
mizes socia1 welfare). For an extended mathematical treatment of welfare maximization, see H. 
VARIAN, MICROI!CONOMIC ANALYSIS 152-55 (1978). 
25. No copyright analyst has demonstrated that efficiency actually is copyright's primary con-
cept. However, some analysts use efficiency as if this were the case. See Landes & Posner, supra note 5 
(describing copyright's major doctrines as the promotion of economic efficiency). See also A.M. POLIN-
SKY, AN INTRODUcnON TO LAW AND EcONOMICS 119-27 (2d ed. 1989) (arguing that efficiency con-
siderations should be the primary basis for choice of legal rules); R. POSNER, EcoNOMIC ANALYSIS Of 
LAW 24 (3d ed. 1986) ("[t]he economic theory of law is the most promising positive theory of law 
extant"). For additional articles in which efficiency is the primary tool used to analyze copyright, see 
supra note 5. 
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take place without careful deliberation. Among other things, one 
must wonder about the economists' assumption that social welfare is 
best expressed as money. People certainly do not want to sell every-
thing they have. One would certainly be unlikely to sell one's kidneys. 
In copyright, authors often form emotional attachments to their works 
which are nonpecuniary in nature. Expressing these interests in 
money terms would seem, at the very least, to raise the risk that effi-
ciency will mischaracterize the social value of these interests26 and 
may therefore prove hostile to copyright doctrines which enjoy wide 
SUpport.27 Thus, efficiency should not replace intuition until we are 
certain that efficiency will support well-established copyright 
doctrines.28 
The foregoing sets the stage for this article's inquiry into whether 
copyright's present fair use treatment of parody is efficient. First, ana-
lysts have suggested that the fair use doctrine and its application to 
parody promote efficiency.29 Second, parody's fair use treatmentl° is 
the product of a traditional intuitive cost-benefit analysis.3' The com-
parison of this reasoning to efficiency analysis therefore illuminates the 
general use of efficiency as a positive theory of copyright. Third, we 
can be confident that copyright law should treat parody as a fair use. 
A long string of cases commits the courts to the principle that paro-
dists are entitled to borrow more from an author's work than other 
users.32 Congress has specifically supported this trend by listing par-
26. See Gordon, Book Review, Toward a Jurisprudence of Benefits: The Norms of Copyright and 
the Problem of Pri\IQte Censorship, 57 U. CHI. L. REv. 1009, 1042-43 (1990). 
27. This danger is eloquently expressed by Professor Frank Michelman in his article Norms and 
NormatMty in the Economic Theory of Law, 62 MINN. L. REv. 1015, 1028 (1978): 
The economic fashion in legal criticism has, I believe, a vigorous weedy propensity. In 
various fields of law we are being presented with studies-many of them fine ones, as far as 
they go-that not only analyze the efficiency properties of legal doctrines but also contrib-
ute-perhaps carelessly or heedlessly, but also perhaps blindly or bemusedly-to a general 
sense that the law is good or bad, right or wrong, true or false, mainly insofar as it is or is 
not efficient. 
28. It is also possible that efficiency should be adopted in copyright because efficiency is a superior 
ethical basis on which to base all legal rules. See R. POSNER, THE EcONOMICS OF JUSTICE (1981). 
However, this position has been successfully discredited by numerous critics. See infra note 102. This 
article therefore proceeds without revisiting the question of whether efficiency is the true ethical basis of 
law. 
29. Gordon, supra note 5, at 1633 (explaining fair use doctrine and application to parody in terms 
of efficiency); P. GoLDSTEIN, supra note 5, at 187-212 (taking efficiency approach to both fair use 
doctrine and parody); Landes and Posner, supra note 5, at 357-61 (applying efficiency model to fair use 
and parody). Although each of these authors suggests that parody's fair use treatment promotes effi-
ciency, none actually undertakes a detailed examination of whether this is in fact the case. As this 
article later shows, it is difficult, if not impossible, to defend parody's fair use treatment as efficient. See 
infra notes 120-138 and accompanying text. 
30. See supra note 2. For more detail, see infra notes 35-75 and accompanying text. 
31. See infra notes 35-75 and accompanying text. 
32. See, e.g., Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d 432 (9th Cir. 1986); Elsmere Music, Inc. v. National Broad-
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ody as one of the uses which courts should defend under legislative 
codification of the fair use doctrine.33 Scholars have contributed nu-
merous articles which advocate the maintenance and extension of par-
ody as a fair use. Thus, efficiency ought to account for parody's 
present treatment if it is a truly effective theory of copyright. 34 
Accordingly, the article begins by developing the traditional cost-
benefit analysis which supports parody's fair use treatment. The pur-
pose behind this effort is to explain, but not necessarily endorse, the 
reasoning behind the present treatment of parody by copyright law. 
Next, the article develops an efficiency based model' for the fair use 
doctrine and attempts to use that model to explain copyright's treat-
ment of parody. The article pays particular attention to whether the 
traditional cost-benefit analysis is truly analogous to an efficiency anal-
ysis as well as whether parody's fair use treatment is in fact efficient. 
The article discovers that efficiency explains some, but not all, of the 
decisions that have been made by the courts, and that it is precisely 
efficiency'S reliance upon money that frustrates the article's attempt. 
The article concludes with some observations about the future of copy-
right analysis. 
II. THE TRADITIONAL COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS 
Presently, authors3s own five exclusive rights in their copyrighted 
works. They alone control reproduction, distribution, public perform-
ance, and public display of the copyrighted original. 36 The code also 
grants them control over the preparation of derivative works from the 
casting Co., 482 F. Supp. 741 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 623 F.2d 252 (2d Cir. 1980); Berlin v. E.C. Publica· 
tions, Inc., 329 F.2d 541, 545 (2d Cir.) ("[I]or, as a general proposition, we believe that parody and 
aatire are deserving of substantial freedom") (emphasis in original), cerro denied, 379 U.S. 822 (1964). 
33. H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 65, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CoDE CoNG. & ADMIN. 
NEWS 5659, 5978 Oisting parody as an area in which courts could appropriately use the fair use doc-
trine to limit the exclusive rights of authors). 
34. It might be contended that parody's fair use treatment is not a good test of efficiency's appli-
cability in copyright because parody is a unique way of exploiting copyrightable subject matter. In my 
opinion, such a contention is mistaken, for efficiency theorists themselves have cited parody's fair use 
treatment as an example of copyright's supposed efficiency. See supra note 29. For articles which 
support parody's fair use treatment, see Light, Parody, Burlesque, and the Economic Rationale for 
Copyright, II CoNN. L. REv. 615 (1979); Dorsen, Satiric Appropriation and the Law of Libel, Trade-
mark. and Copyright: Remedies Without Wrongs, 65 B.U.L. REv. 923 (1985); Goetsch, supra note I; 
Note, The Parody Defense to Copyright InfringemenL' Productive Fair Use after Betamax, 97 HARV. L. 
REv. 1395 (1984); M. NIMMER & D. NIMMER, supra note 17, at § 13.05[0] ("[o]n1y by the recognition 
of a fair use defense is society likely to reap the benefit of this socially useful literary genre [of 
parody]"). 
35. Normally the author is the copyright holder, for copyright generally vests copyright in the 
author. 17 U.S.C. § 201 (1988). Accordingly, this article will use copyright holder and author 
interchangeably. 
36. 17 U.S.C. § 106(1), (3), (4), (5). 
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copyrighted original.37 Individuals who exploit these rights without 
the author's permission may face either civil38 or criminal39 prosecu-
tion for copyright infringement.40 Together, these provisions suggest 
that authors should be able to control production of parodies based on 
their copyrighted works . 
. As an initial matter, it is clear that parodies infringe the author's 
right to control creation of "derivative works." Since parodies always 
borrow and recast the plot, words, and style of a preexisting original, 
they necessarily fall under the definition of derivative work.41 Fur-
thermore, such a finding of infringement would seem to serve the basic 
goal of copyright. Parodists, like many authors, work in large part 
because they are paid for their creations. In fact, a quick look at the 
reported parody cases shows that the defendants in those cases gener-
ally achieved broad commercial dissemination of their parodies, 
thereby reaping generous remuneration.42 Treating parodies as in-
fringements would simply force parodists to use the money they earn 
to buy the necessary rights from authors. In turn, this would increase 
authors' financial incentives to create new material. 43 
Of course, courts have not applied copyright law to parody in this 
fashion. Instead of consistently treating parodists as copyright infring-
ers, courts have given parodists considerable license to borrow freely 
from copyrighted works.44 The parodist need only satisfy two thresh-
37. 17 U.S.C. § 106(2). 
38. 17 U.S.C. § 501(b). 
39. 17 U.S.C. § 506(a). Criminal prosecutions apply only to willful infringement for commercial 
advantage or private financial gain. Id. 
40. 17 U.S.C. § 501(a). 
41. The copyright code defines a "derivative work" as 
a work based upon one or more preexisting works, such as a translation, musical arrange-
ment, dramatization, fictionalization, motion picture version, sound recording, art repro-
duction, abridgment, condensation, or any other form in which a work may be recast, 
transformed, or adapted. A work consisting of editorial revisions, annotations, elabora· 
tions, or other modifications which, as a whole, represent an original work of authorship, is 
a "derivative work." 
17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988). See also Goldstein, supra note 2, at 234 ("[pjarodies and satires represent 
derivative uses no less than dramatizations, abridgments or other arrangements of the underlying 
work"). 
42. See, e.g .. Benny v. Loew's Inc., 239 F.2d 532 (9th Cir. 1956), aff'd by an equally divided coun 
sub nom. Columbia Broadcasting Sys. v. Loew's, Inc., 356 U.S. 43 (1958) (parody appeared on com-
mercial television). Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d 432 (9th Cir. 1986) (parody distributed on record); El-
smere Music, Inc. v. National Broadcasting Co., 483 F.Supp. 741 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 623 F.2d 252 (2d 
Cir. 1980) (parody part of Saturday Night Live television show); Berlin v. E.C. Publications, Inc., 329 
F.2d 541 (2d Cir. 1964), cen. denied, 379 U.S. 822 (1964) (parody distributed in Mad Magazine). 
43. For a discussion of this reasoning in an efficiency context, see infra notes 104-105 and accom-
panying text. 
44. Although the parodist's special privilege to borrow from copyrighted works is presently weD 
established, its somewhat confused development is worth repeating. The relevant history begins with 
the May 6, 1955 decision in Loew's Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 131 F. Supp. 16S (S.D. Cal. 
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old requirements. First, her work must contain some criticism of the 
original work.45 Second, her work must not function as a substitute 
for the underlying work. 46 Once these requirements have been satis-
fied, the parodist may freely borrow the material that is "reasonably 
necessary to conjure up the original."47 The explanation for this result 
1955), aff'd sub nom. Benny v. Loew's, Inc., 239 F.2d 532 (9th Cir. 1956), aff'd by an equally divided 
court sub nom. Columbia Broadcasting Sys. v. Loew's, Inc., 356 U.S. 43 (1958). In Loew's, the plaintiffs 
owned the copyright in the movie Gaslight, which starred Charles Boyer and Ingrid Bergman. Id. at 
168. The defendant, Jack Benny, created Autolight, a television burlesque of Gaslight. Id. at 169·70. 
The plaintiffs sued for copyright infringement. Benny defended on grounds of fair use. Id. at 172-73. 
In ruling for the plaintiffs, Judge Carter rejected Benny's contention that parodists should be given 
special permission to borrow from copyrighted originals. The court specifically held that "a parodized 
or burlesqued taking is treated no differently from any other appropriation." Id. at 177. 
Interestingly, Judge Carter changed his mind a mere seven months later. In Columbia Pictures 
Corp. v. National Broadcasting Co .• 137 F. Supp. 348 (S.D. Cal. 1955). he considered a copyright suit 
against the creators of From Here to Obscurity. a parody of the movie From Here to Eternity. Despite 
his ruling in Loew's. Judge Carter wrote: 
When the alleged infringing work is of the same character as the copyrighted work. viz .• a 
serious work with a taking from another serious copyrighted work. then the line [between 
infringement and permissible borrowing) is drawn more strictly than when a farce or com-
edy or burlesque takes from a serious copyrighted work or vice versa. 
Id. at 350. Under normal circumstances. Judge Carter's decision would have established the parodist's 
special right to borrow from copyrighted originals. In the meantime. however. the losing defendants in 
Loew's had appealed to the Ninth Circuit. On December 26. 1956. that court affirmed Judge Carter's 
earlier decision in Loew's. Benny v. Loew·s. Inc .• 239 F.2d 532 (9th Cir. 1956). aff'd by an equally 
divided court sub nom. Columbia Broadcasting Sys. v. Loew·s. Inc .• 356 U.S. 43 (1958). Thus. despite 
Judge Carter's new ruling in Columbia, the controlling law in the Ninth Circuit was that parodies were 
to be treated in the same way as other forms of copyright infringement. 
This state of affairs persisted until 1964 when the Second Circuit expressly held that parodies are 
"deserving of substantial freedom" in Berlin v. E.C. Publications. 329 F.2d 541. 545 (2d Cir. 1964). 
The resulting conflict between the Second and Ninth Circuits was not resolved until 1978. when the 
Ninth Circuit repUdiated its statement in Benny. See Walt Disney Prods. v. Air Pirates. 581 F.2d 751. 
757 n.13 (9th Cir. 1978) ("In so construing Benny. we necessarily disagree with its dictum that a parody 
is treated no differently than any other taking."). cert. denied. 439 U.S. 1132 (1979). 
45. See. e.g .• Fisher v. Dees. 794 F.2d 432. 436 (9th Cir. 1986); MCA. Inc. v. Wilson. 677 F.2d 
180.185 (2d Cir. 1981); Walt Disney Prods. v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751. 758 n.15 (9th Cir. 1978). cert. 
denied. 439 U.S. 1132 (1979). See also Note. 55 TEMPLE L. Q. 1100 (1982). But see Elsmere Music. 
Inc. v. National Broadcasting Co .• 482 F. Supp. 741.746 (S.D. N.Y.), aff'd, 623 F.2d 252 (2d Cir. 1980) 
("the issue to be resolved by a court is whether the use in question is a valid satire or parody. and not 
whether it is a parody of the copied song itself"). 
46. Fisher v. Dees. 794 F.2d 432. 437-38 (9th Cir. 1986); New Line Cinema Corp. v. Bertlesman 
Music Group. Inc .• 693 F. Supp. 1517. 1528 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer. Inc. v. Show-
case Atlanta Coop. Prods .• Inc .• 479 F. Supp. 351. 361 (N.D. Ga. 1979). See also Note. supra note 34. 
at 1409-11; M. NIMMER & D. NIMMER. supra note 17. at § 13.05[B). 
47. Berlin v. E.C. Publication. Inc .• 329 F.2d 541. 545 (2d Cir. 1964); Fisher v. Dees. 794 F.2d 
432. 438-39 (9th Cir. 1986); Elsmere Music. Inc. v. National Broadcasting Co .• 482 F. Supp. 741. 747 
(S.D.N.Y.). aff'd. 623 F.2d 252 (2d Cir. 1980). 
For some time there was a conflict between the Second and Ninth Circuits over the amount a 
parodist could borrow under the fair use doctrine. The Ninth Circuit took the position that the paro-
dist could borrow only as much as was absolutely necessary to conjure up the original work. See Walt 
Disney Prods. v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751. 758 (9th Cir. 1978). cerL denied. 439 U.S. 1132 (1979): 
[The parodist'sl desire to make the "best parody" is balanced against the rights of the 
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lies in the courts' intuitive application of the so-called "fair use 
doctrine. "48 
In its presently codified form,49 that doctrine excuses otherwise 
infringing use of a copyrighted work as "fair" if the court resolves four 
factors in the defendant's favor: 1) the purpose and character of the 
use, 2) the nature of the copyrighted work, 3) the amount of the copy-
righted work used, and 4) the effect of the use on the potential market 
or value of the copyrighted work.so Not surprisingly, these factors are 
generally evaluated by referring to copyright's basic purposes. 5 I 
Courts tend to find a given use fair when they believe that a finding of 
infringement would be inconsistent with copyright's promotion of so-
cial welfare. 52 Thus, a cost-benefit analysis of the social consequences 
copyright owner in his original expressions. That balance bas been struck at giving the 
parodist what is necessory to conjure up the original . ... 
(Emphasis added.) By contrast, the Second Circuit allowed the author the right to borrow substantially 
more: 
A parody is entitled at least to "conjure up" the original. Even more extensive use MIOuld still 
be fair use, provided the parody builds upon the original, using the original as a known 
element of modern culture and contributing something new for humorous effect or 
commentary. 
Elsmere Music, Inc. v. National Broadcasting Co .• 623 F.2d 252, 253 n.1 (2d Cir. 1980) (empbasis 
added). The Ninth Circuit in Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d 432 (9th Cir. 1986) eventually adopted a posi-
tion similar to that of the Second Circuit. In citing Elsmere with approval, the Fisher court expressly 
disagreed with the "rigid view" of the Air Pirates court. Id. at 438-39. See also M. NIMMER & D. 
NIMMER, supra note 17, at § \3.05[C]. 
48. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1988). 
49. Although presently codified, the fair use doctrine originated as a judge-made exception to an 
author's rights under the Copyright Code. Congress explicitly recognized fair use for the first time 
when it revised the Copyright Code in 1976. H.R. REp. No. 1476, supra note 33, at 65. In doing so, 
Congress clearly stated its intention to simply restate existing judicial practice. Congress specifically 
encouraged continued development of the fair use doctrine through the common law process. Id. at 66 
("Beyond a very broad statutory explanation of what fair use is and some of the criteria applicable to it, 
the courts must be free to adapt the doctrine to particular situations on a case-by-case basis. Section 
107 is intended to restate the present judicial doctrine offair use, not to change, narrow, or enlarge it in 
any way."). 
50. 17 U.S.c. § 107. 
51. A complete discussion of the fair use doctrine is beyond the scope of this article. Suffice it to 
say that an accurate and succinct explanation for the doctrine eludes the best legal minds. For exam-
ple, Iustice Blackmun has labeled fair use "the most troublesome in the whole law of copyright." Sony 
Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 475 (1984) (Blackmun, I., dissenting) 
(quoting Dellar v. Samuel Goldwyn, Inc., 104 F.2d 661, 662 (2d Cir. 1939». A telling anecdote about 
the difficulty of fair use is the cartoon by Bion Smalley which Professor Melville Nimmer included in 
his textbook. In the cartoon, a traveler seeking wisdom climbs a mountain to ask a wise man, "What is 
fair use?" M. NIMMER, COPYRIGHT 67 (3d ed. \985). For three recent extended discussions of fair 
use, see Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure, supra note 5; Fisher, supra note 5; Dratler, Distilling the 
Witches' Brew of Fair Use in Copyright Law, 43 U. MIAMI L. REv. 233 (1988). 
52. See Rosemont Enters., Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303, 307 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. 
denied, 385 U.S. 1009 (1967) ("[t)he fundamental justification for the [fair use) privilege lies in the 
constitutional purpose in granting copyright protection in the first instance, to wit, 'To Promote the 
Progress of Science and the Useful Arts' "); M. NIMMER & D. NIMMER, supra note 17, at § 13.05. See 
also Dratler. supra note 51; Leval. Toward a Fair Use Standard. 103 HARV. L. REv. 110S (1990). 
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associated with parody's fair use treatment should explain the present 
state of the law. 53 
Construction of such an analysis requires the assessment and 
comparison of three consequences associated with the fair use treat-
ment of parody. First, the public would gain access to a popular form 
of humor. 54 Second, the public would benefit from the critical per-
spectives of the parodist. 55 Third, authors would lose the opportunity 
to commercially exploit their works through parody. 56 
Reference to copyright's general purpose of encouraging creativity is by far the most common touch-
stone for fair use analysis. However, other perspectives have been suggested. See H.R. REP. No. 1476, 
supro note 33, at 65 (characterizing fair use as an equitable rule of reason); Weinreb, Fair's Fair: A 
Comment on the Fair Use Doctrine, 103 HARV. L. REv. 1137 (1990) (explaining fair use in terms of 
fairness). 
53. Although courts do not consistently relate parody's fair use treatment to the four factors 
outlined in the copyright statute, it is worth noting how this would be done. The first threshold re-
quirement (that the parody contain some criticism of the underlying original) is analogous to the first 
fair use factor (the purpose and character of the use). The second threshold requirement (that the 
parody not function as a substitute for the original) corresponds to the fourth fair use factor (the effect 
on the market for the original work). The parodist's ability to borrow enough so as to "conjure up" the 
original work relates to the third fair use factor (the amount of the copyrighted work used). Thus, if a 
court finds that a given parody is a fair use, three of the four statutory fair use factors will have been 
resolved in the defendant's favor. Only the second fair use factor (the nature of the copyrighted work) 
would go in the plaintiff's favor. See Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d 432 (9th Cir. 1986) (applying fair use 
defense to parody in light of statutory factors). 
54. See Elsmere Music, Inc. v. National Broadcasting Co., 623 F.2d 252, 253 (2d Cir. 1980) ("in 
today's world of often unrelieved solemnity, copyright law should be hospitable to the humor of par-
ody"); Netterville, supro note I, at 227 (describing benefits of laughter). 
55. See Berlin v. E.C. Publications, Inc. 329 F.2d 541 (2d Cir. 1964) ("we believe that parody and 
satire are deserving of substantial freedom-both as entertainment and as a form of social and literary 
criticism"), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 822 (1964); Dorsen, supra note 34, at 924 ("satire is a potent form of 
social commentary"); Goetsch, supra note I, at 41 (describing value of parody as arising from both 
entertainment and criticism). 
56. See New Line Cinema Corp. V. Bertlesman Music Group, Inc., 693 F. Supp. 1517, 1528 
(S.D.N.Y. 1988). A fourth consequence has been identified and consistently ignored by courts and 
commentators alike. As the reader might well imagine, parodies sometimes harm an author's emotions 
or reputation. Authors understandably resent being ridiculed, especially through the twisting of their 
own work. See Dorsen, supra note 34, at 925 ("satire often causes hurt feelings or embarrassment"). 
The reasons for ignoring this consequence seem intuitive and have never been made clear. B. KAPLAN, 
AN UNHURRIED VIEW OF COPYRIGHT 69 (1967) ("we must accept the harsh truth that parody may 
quite legitimately aim at garroting the original"); Dorsen, supra note 34, at 964; Light, supra note 34, at 
634; Fisher V. Dees, 794 F.2d 432, 437 (9th Cir. 1986) (citing Kaplan and excluding critical impact of 
parody from cost-benefit analysis). Three plausible reasons for ignoring this harm come to mind. 
First, since copyright generally works through the provision of financial incentives it would seem 
that protecting the author's emotional loss bears no relationship to encouraging creative activity. See 
Gordon, supra note 26, at 104Q..41. Second, the first amendment may well require that copyright not 
stifle the expression of a critical opinion. See B. KAPLAN, supra, at 69 ("I will not conceal my view that 
it was wrong-and possibly unconstitutional-to hold Jack Benny for his television parody of the 
movie Gaslight"); Goetsch, supra note 1. Finally, one might contend that any harm suffered by authors 
at the hands of parodists is a fair consequence of their fame. See Note, supra note 34, at 1409 (distin-
guishing fair from unfair incentives in the context of parody); MCA, Inc V. Wilson, 677 F.2d 180, 191 
(2d Cir. 1981) ("permissible parody, whether or not in good taste, is the price an artist pays for success, 
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Our analysis begins by estimating the extent to which society can 
enjoy the benefits of parody without granting parodists favorable fair 
use treatment. As noted previously, parodists often achieve strong 
commercial rewards for their work. 57 The availability of such finan-
cial resources suggests that parodies would be widely available even 
without generous fair use treatment. After all, producers who tum 
novels into movies are not driven out of business by having to buy 
rights from novelists. It would therefore seem that· parodists would 
also be able to buy similar rights from the authors whose works will be 
used. Fair use treatment for parody would therefore do little to 
change the composition of public discourse or advance the public 
interest. 58 
However, closer examination reveals that the sale of movie rights 
is vastly different from the sale of parody rights. When an author 
parts with his movie rights, he gains more than money. If the movie is 
successful, the author's reputation grows. Consumers who have never 
read the author's work will form favorable opinions of it. They may 
even buy the book itself. By contrast, the sale of parody rights exposes 
the author to risks that few authors desire. If the parody is successful, 
the author's reputation does not grow. Instead, the author and his 
work become the target of the parodist's humor. 59 This result makes 
it highly unlikely that an author will sell parody rights to his work at 
any price. As an initial matter, parodists who inquire about the availa-
bility of parody rights generally meet the reply that the rights are sim-
ply not for sale.60 Furthermore, authors who sue parodists often seem 
as concerned with stopping unflattering references to their work as 
they are with any financialloss. 61 
The general refusal of authors to sell their parody rights makes it 
highly likely that parodies would be rare without fair use treatment. 
The public would therefore enjoy few, if any, of parody's benefits in 
just as a public figure must tolerate more personal attack than the average private citizen") (Mansfield, 
I., dissenting). 
57. See supra note 42. 
58. For a discussion of this in an efficiency context, see infra note 91 and accompanying text. 
59. See Dorsen, supra note 34, at 925. 
60. Gordon, supra note 26, at 1043; Dorsen, supra note 34, at 960. See also Fisher v. Dees, 794 
F.2d 432, 437 (9th Cir. 1986), where the court stated: 
Parodists will seldom get permission from those whose works are parodied. Self-esteem is 
seldom strong enough to permit the granting of permission even in exchange for a reason-
able fee. The parody defense to copyright infringement exists precisely to make possible a 
use that generally cannot be bought. 
(citations omitted). 
61. Light, supra note 34, at 633. As the attorney for the copyright holder in Benny v. Loew's 
stated, "[W]e are not against laughter-at least so long as the laugh is not at our expense." Schooner, 
Obscene Parody, I. ARTS MGMT. & L., Fall 1984, at 91 n.158. 
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the absence of treating parody as a fair use.62 However, this does not 
necessarily mean that fair use treatment for all parodies is warranted, 
for different types of parodies bring different benefits to the public. 
The most obvious link between parody and the public interest is 
parody's humor. The public generally consumes parodies because 
they generate a good laugh. Humor is certainly an important part of 
society, and it provides some reason to encourage the creation of paro-
dies.63 However, parody's link to humor is not, in and of itself, a terri-
bly good reason to encourage its creation. If nothing else, there is the 
danger that fair use treatment for humorous use could become an invi-
tation to open ended misappropriation of copyrighted material. Too 
much unauthorized borrowing might erode the financial incentives 
that presently encourage the authors of original source material and 
offset whatever public benefits stem from parody's humor.64 More-
over, since good sources of humor would exist with or without parody, 
one might argue that parody's fair use treatment gives society rela-
tively little in return for putting copyright's basic structure at risk.65 
Fortunately, a successful parody does much more than just give 
the public a good laugh. It also provides a very unique criticism of 
literary and social foibles. The twisting and ridicule which forms the 
heart of good parody enables the public to experience first hand the 
silliness of literary and social conventions. This combination of laugh-
ter and criticism is unmatched by any other artistic genre, and it car-
62. See M. NIMMER & O. NIMMER, supra note 17, at § 13.05[C] ("[o]nly by the recognition of a 
fair use defense is society likely to reap the benefit of (parody]"); Netterville, supra note I, at 237 
(noting that availability of parodies on television decreased dramatically after Benny v. Loew's (dis-
cussed supra at note 44». 
63. See supra note 54. 
64. This reasoning is perhaps best reflected in the statement of Judge Carter: 
The defense. "I only burlesqued" the copyrighted material is not per se a defense. To hold 
otherwise would seriously jeopardize rights of property in copyrights and investments in 
such works, and would ultimately seriously damage the prices to be paid to authors for 
their literary works .... Unlimited and unrestrained taking by burlesque could destroy the 
Copyright Act, undennine the motion picture industry, the legitimate stage, and reduce the 
author to his status of 300 years ago,--dependent on the largess of the Prince or Patron. 
Columbia Pictures Corp. v. National Broadcasting Co., 137 F. Supp. 348, 350-51 (S.D. Cal. 1955) 
(citation omitted). The Second Circuit more recently took a similar position in MCA, Inc. v. Wilson, 
677 F.2d 180. 185 (2d Cir. 1981): 
We are not prepared to hold that a commercial composer can plagiarize a competitor's 
copyrighted song, substitute dirty lyrics of his own, perform it for commercial gain, and 
then escape liability by calling the end result a parody or satire on the mores of society. 
Such a holding would be an open-ended invitation to musical plagiarism. 
See also M. NIMMER & O. NIMMER, supra note 17, at § 13.05[C] (criticizing possibility that fair use 
treatment for parody might allow wholesale appropriation of copyrighted material as long as some 
element of humor was added). 
65. See P. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 5, at 211-12 (arguing that sufficient public domain material 
exists for creation of parodies which do not criticize the underlying original). 
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ries the potential to enrich public discourse and precipitate social 
change. Effective parodies therefore offer the public a very special and 
unique benefit in exchange for any resulting risk to copyright's under-
lying system of incentives. 66 
The foregoing suggests that our cost-benefit assessment depends 
on the sort of parody that the fair use doctrine' encourages. If fair use 
spurs the creation of parodies whose value lies strictly in humor, the 
benefits to society appear equivalent to those provided by other forms 
of humor. However, iff air use stimulates the creation of parodies that 
criticize literary and social conventions, society gains a unique benefit. 
Thus, the case for treating parody as a fair use is much stronger when 
the parody in question involves criticism of some sort.67 Comparing 
the losses associated with parody against the gains reinforces this 
conclusion. 
As the reader will recall, the fair use treatment of parody prevents 
the author from exploiting her own work through this medium. 68 
This ostensibly reduces the financial return the author can reap from 
her work, thereby harming the financial incentives of copyright law. 
However, it must be noted that authors can reap financial incentives 
only from those uses that they reasonably could be expected to ex-
ploit. 69 It therefore stands to reason that copyright need not protect 
uses that authors have no intention of exploiting, for protecting those 
uses would have no effect on copyright's financial incentives. 
Normally, allowing individuals to borrow freely from copyrighted 
works erodes the incentives for the creation of new original material. 
For example, if television producers were allowed to tum novels into 
66, See Chagares, Parody or Piracy: The Protective Scope of the Fair Use Defense to Copyright 
Infringement Actions Regarding Parodies, 12 COLUM. 1.L. & ARTS 229, 230·31 (1988): 
Artistic as well as legal scholars universally agree that parody fulfills an important function 
in society. Aside from its entertainment value, parody is an important vehicle for both 
artistic and societal criticism, accomplishing its purpose by "exposing the mediocre and the 
pretentious." Consequently, this art form influences the development of popular culture 
and, generally, the development of society. 
(Footnotes omitted). See also Dorsen, supra note 34, at 924 (describing social value of parody); 
Goetsch, supra note I, at 41-42. 
67. See, e.g., MCA, Inc. v. Wilson, 677 F.2d 180 (2d Cir. 1981) (holding that the parody "Cunni· 
Iingus Champion of Company C" was not a fair use of "Boogie Woogie Bugle Boy of Company B," in 
part because the defendant's work did not criticize the underlying original); New Line Cinema Corp. v. 
Bertlesman Music Group, Inc., 693 F. Supp. 1517 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (refusing to apply fair use defense 
while expressing doubt about critical value of defendants' parody); Metro·Goldwyn.Mayer, Inc. v. 
Showcase Atlanta Coop. Prod., Inc., 479 F. Supp. 35 I (N.D. Ga. 1979) (noting that defendant's parody 
was not critical commentary on the underlying original work and refusing to apply fair use defense). 
See also infra note 72. 
68. See supra note 56 and accompanying text. 
69. Cf, Gordon, supra note 5, at 1632 ("[tJhe usual economic assumption is that the owner of a 
resource will either exploit that resource himself, or will sell it to someone else who will"). 
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sitcoms for no charge, the number of novels written would presumably 
decrease, thereby harming the public interest. Copyright law avoids 
this result by forcing producers to use the money raised through ad-
vertising to pay novelists for the rights to use their works. These pay-
ments stimulate further writings. 70 
However, as noted above, the sale of parody rights is vastly differ-
ent from the sale of other derivative rights. Authors anxious to avoid 
being humiliated will seldom, if ever, voluntarily expose their own 
work to a critical parody.71 By contrast, if a proposed parody were 
merely humorous, but not critical, there is no particular reason why 
an author might not license the use.72 This dichotomy has powerful 
consequences for parody's possible erosion of copyright incentives. As 
an initial matter, it shows that fair use treatment for parodies that are 
critical of the original will not generally affect the financial returns 
which spur creative activity.73 Conversely, it shows that parodies 
whose value lies primarily in humor are poor candidates for fair use 
treatment because their limited value74 is offset by a very real risk to 
copyright incentives.75 
The foregoing provides a good intuitive cost-benefit explanation 
of why courts treat parody as they have under the fair use doctrine. 
70. See supra notes 8-10 and accompanying text. 
71. See supra notes 59-61 and accompanying text. 
72. See New Line Cinema Corp. v. 8ertlesman Music Group, Inc., 693 F. Supp. 1517 (S.D.N.Y. 
1988). In New Line, the plaintiff copyright holders of the movie A Nightmare on Elm Street decided to 
make a rap music video based on the movie and its lead character, Freddy Krueger. However, before 
the plaintiffs' video could be finished, the defendants produced their own competing rap video. The 
plaintiffs sued, alleging copyright violation. 
In response to the plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunction, the defendants argued that their 
video was a parody of the plaintiffs' work and that fair use should therefore apply. Id. at 1524. The 
court correctly rejected this contention. Id. at 1531. First, the court expressed serious doubt about 
whether the defendants' video made any critical statements about the underlying original work. Id. at 
1525. More importantly, the court noted that the defendants' video was a direct substitute for the 
plaintiffs' video. Id. at 1528. The resulting harm to the plaintiffs' financial copyright interests played a 
major role in the court's final decision. 
New Line provides an excellent illustration of the relationship between criticism, a copyright 
holder's willingness to exploit his work through parody, and the intuitive cost-benefit analysis courts 
apply to parodies. Even though their use of the underlying original was humorous, the defendants loSt 
because the court found that their work lacked social value and threatened the plaintiffs' copyright 
incentives. The reasoning behind this conclusion seems clear. Since the defendants' parody did not 
criticize the copyrighted movie and characters, its social value was marginal. At the same time, this 
lack of criticism meant that the plaintiffs therefore became willing to exploit this use of the underlying 
original themselves, and the defendants' work clearly harmed the plaintiffs' financial copyright 
incentives. 
73. Light, supra note 34, at 633. 
74. See supra notes 63-67 and accompanying text. 
75. See Note, supra note 34, at 1410 ("[t]he standard [for establishing the potential substitution of 
a parody for the original work] should include prospective competition with uses that the copyright 
holder is reasonably likely to attempt in the future"). 
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The threshold requirement that a parody must criticize the underlying 
originaF6 makes sure that parody's fair use treatment reaps a unique 
and positive benefit for the public in return for any possible harm to 
copyright's system of financial incentives. Similarly, the requirement 
that parodies not serve as substitutes for originals 77 ensures that those 
incentives are not seriously harmed by the fair use doctrine. In situa-
tions where both of these conditions have been met, it seems clear that 
society has much to gain 78 and little to lose from granting parodists 
special permission to borrow from copyrighted works. Thus, courts 
allow parodists whose works pass the threshold conditions to borrow 
whatever amount is "reasonably necessary to conjure up the origi-
nal.,,79 This explanation sets the stage for our examination of whether 
economic efficiency really does capture conventional copyright 
analysis. 
III. PARODY AS EFFICIENCY 
A. Concepts of Efficiency 
Two closely related concepts of efficiency are critical to our analy-
sis. The first concept is Pareto efficiency. 80 A Pareto efficient state of 
affairs is one in which no individual can be made better off without 
inflicting a loss on at least one other person. Thus, a situation P is 
Pareto superior to situation Q if all individuals in society are as well or 
better of in P than they are in Q.81 
The second concept is Kaldor-Hicks efficiency. A Kaldor-Hicks 
efficient state of affairs is one in which no individual or group of indi-
viduals can be made better off without inflicting losseS on others which 
exceed the amount of the gains. Thus, situation X is Kaldor-Hicks 
superior to situation Y as long as the gains of those who are better off 
in situation X can fully compensate those who are worse off than they 
were in situation Y. 82 Brief reflection reveals how both of these con-
cepts could be used by a court analyzing the fair use doctrine. 
A fundamental proposition of modern economics is that the self-
76. See supra note 4S and accompanying text. 
77. See supra note 46 and accompanying text. 
78. Remember, successful parody won't exist at all without fair use treatment. See supra note 62 
and accompanying text. 
79. See supra note 47 and accompanying text. 
80. This concept is named after Vilfredo Pareto, the Italian economist who developed it. See M. 
LUTZ & K. Lux, THE CHALLENGE OF HUMANISTIC EcONOMICS 92 (1979). 
81. J. COLEMAN, supra note 3, at 97-98. 
82. Id. at 98-100. Put somewhat differently, a situation A is Kaldor-Hicks superior to situation B 
if A is potentially Pareto superior to B. It therefore follows that situation A is Kaldor-Hicks efficient if 
no other potentially Pareto superior situations exist. 
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interested actions of individuals creates a Pareto efficient state of af-
fairs. This proposition flows from the assumption that rational83 indi-
viduals will pursue what they subjectively84 believe is in their self 
interest. This pursuit leads to a series of mutually beneficial transac-
tions with other individuals which continues until all possibility of 
such exchange is exhausted. When this result is reached, no individual 
can improve her welfare without harming the welfare of another. The 
result is therefore Pareto efficient.85 More importantly, economic the-
ory also equates the attainment of Pareto efficiency under perfect mar-
ket conditions86 with a socially optimal state of affairs. 87 
For example, suppose that the author of a comic strip is inter-
ested in making an animated film based upon his comic strip charac-
ters. The cartoonist correctly perceives that the public would pay a 
83. Among other things, the rational person has preferences which are complete and transitive. 
Completeness guarantees that any two alternatives can be compared. Thus, the rational person either 
prefers X to Y, prefers Y to X, or is indifferent between X and Y. Transitivity guarantees that if A is 
preferred to B and B is preferred to C, than A is preferred to C. Economists also aasume that these 
preferences never change. See Georgescu-Roegen, Choice. Expectations and Measurability, 68 Q~J. 
EcON. 503, 505-10 (1954) (defining the traits of rational economic actor); H. VARIAN, supra note 24, 
80-84 (presenting basic assumptions about consumer preferences). 
, 84. See R. CooTER & T. ULEN, LAW AND EcONOMICS 23 (1988) (the preferences ofa consumer 
are "purely subjective"; they are "his or her preferences, to be discovered by finding out what he or she 
likes, not by telling him or her what to like"); M. LUTZ & K. Lux, supra note 80, at 93 ("[a]ccording to 
[the theory of the rational person], whatever he or she does in the market is deemed the rational and 
preferable thing to do"). The sovereignty of subjective preferences is of paramount importance to any 
efficiency based theory of law, for it forces the economist to take account of all human desires, no 
matter how foolish or immoral. Interestingly, it is precisely the economist's acceptance of SUbjective 
preferences which ultimately frustrates the efficiency explanation for parody's fair use treatment. See 
infra notes 127-138 and accompanying text. 
85. R. COOTER & T. ULEN, supra note 84, at 44-45. 
86. The perfect market is characterized by the presence of perfect information and the absence of 
transaction costs, monopolies, externalities, and public goods. Id. at 45. The failure of these conditions 
destroys the market's presumptive advancement of the social welfare. See infra notes 92-95 and accom-
panying text. 
For our purposes, the aasumed nonexistence of externalities is of particular interest. See infra 
notes 109-115 and accompanying text. Externalities exist when a person fails to enjoy (or bear) the full 
economic consequences of her actions. When externalities occur, the market's presumptive social op-
timality disappears because voluntary exchange no longer accounts for the full social costs and benefits 
of a given transaction. To take a common example, consider the actions of a steel mill that pollutes the 
surrounding air. In deciding how much steel to produce, the mill weighs the cost of materials, energy, 
and labor against the price for which it can sell the steel. Under perfect conditions, the price consumers 
are willing to pay for the steel reflects its social value. Thus, the steel mill produces the socially optimal 
amount of steel when it meets the demands of its customers. However, the existence of pollution cre-
ates an externality which destroys this result. Although the price of steel reflects its value to the steel 
mill's customers, it does not reflect the harm caused by pollution to the steel mill's neighbors. Thus, the 
mill believes that its steel is more valuable to society than it actually is, and the mill produces more than 
the socially optimal level of steel. See RUFFIN & GREGORY, PRINCIPLES OF MICROECONOMICS 225 
(4th ed. 1990) (defining externality and its effect on the market); see also A.M. POLINSKY, supra note 
25, at 15-25 (discussing efficiency criteria in the determinations of nuisance law remedies). 
87. R. COOTER & T. ULEN, supra note 84, at 44-47. 
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total of $500,000 to see the film and that it would cost him $450,000 to 
make the film. Suppose further that a movie studio is also interested 
in making the animated film and that they could produce it for a cost 
of $440,000. In this situation, the process of voluntary exchange will 
improve social welfare. 
Since the studio can produce the movie for only $440,000, it 
stands to improve its welfare by $60,000.88 Of course, the studio can-
not reap this profit without the cartoonist's cooperation. The studio 
will therefore try to buy the necessary rights from the cartoonist for a 
price as high as $59,999, for any price in this range will still allow the 
studio to produce the movie profitably. At the same time, the author 
realizes that the most he can profit by making the movie alone is 
$50,000.89 He therefore will sell the necessary rights to the movie stu-
dio if the studio offers him more than $50,000. 
The foregoing analysis implies that the movie studio will buy the 
necessary rights from the cartoonist for a price between $50,001 and 
$59,999. Such an exchange would improve the welfare of both the 
studio and the cartoonist while satisfying the public's demand for the 
movie. This result represents the improvement of social welfare. The 
author is better off because the money offered by the studio is more 
than the author could earn by making the movie himself. The studio 
is better off because the exchange produced a profit that the studio 
could not have realized alone. The public is also better off because it 
values the experience of watching the film at something greater than 
$500,000. 
The foregoing economic observations suggest that courts can pro-
mote the public interest by interpreting laws to promote Pareto effi-
ciency. The basic judicial posture is simple. Courts should 
presumptively enforce the status quo because voluntary exchange 
leads to Pareto efficiency, which in tum represents a social optimum.90 
Thus, any interference with the product of such exchange must be 
inefficient and presumptively undesirable.91 This reasoning governs as 
long as perfect market conditions exist. 
If, however, perfect conditions do not exist (i.e. there is a "mark,et 
88. $500,000 revenue - $440,000 cost = $60,000. 
89. $500,000 revenue - $450,000 cost = $50,000. 
90. See supra note 87 and accompanying text. 
91. Indeed, judicial attempts to interfere with the status quo are likely to be defeated by the . 
process of voluntary exchange, so there is generally no point in trying to do anything about the status 
quo anyway. This conclusion is the result of the so-called Coasean theorem, which states that under 
perfect conditions society will allocate resources in a Pareto efficient manner regardless of how the law 
assigns those resources. See Coase, The Problem 0/ Social Cost, 31.L. & EcON. 1 (1960). See also A.M. 
POLINSKY, supra note 25, at 11-13; R. CooTER & T. ULEN, supra note 84, at 4-6. 
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failure"), the court's task becomes more complicated, for the outcome 
of voluntary exchange under imperfect conditions is not necessarily 
socially optimal. In the example given previously, suppose now that it 
costs the studio $10,000 to conclude any sale of the necessary rights.92 
In this situation, the sale from cartoonist to studio will not happen. 
Since the studio is willing to spend up to $59,999 to acquire the movie 
rights, the $10,000 transaction cost prevents the studio from offering 
the author a sufficiently high purchase price.93 Although the movie 
will still be made,94 society's total wealth suffers because neither the 
cartoonist nor studio is as well off as either would have been in the 
absence of transaction costs. In particular, the studio reaps no profit 
while the cartoonist's profit is diminished.9s 
The foregoing example shows that courts confronted with imper-
fect markets should not necessarily enforce the status quo. Since the 
market no longer presumptively maximizes social welfare, courts must 
independently determine whether the status quo mirrors the result of 
the free market. Welfare economists generally solve this problem by 
making two key assumptions. First, economists generally assume that 
individuals value all gains and losses according to a single scale, usu-
ally money.96 Second, they assume that money can always be redis-
tributed among individuals without cost. 97 
Together, these assumptions enable the economist to promote 
Pareto efficiency by using the Kaldor-Hicks concept. Since all gains 
and losses may now be measured in dollars, the economist can per-
form a cost-benefit analysis to evaluate any proposed change in the 
status quo. She simply measures and compares how much the affected 
parties are willing to payor accept to cause or allow the change.98 If 
the "winners" could pay a subjectively adequate sum of money to the 
92. This is a failure of the no transaction costs assumption. The costs might represent legal fees, 
telephone bills, office supplies, or time spent negotiating. 
93. The studio is willing to spend $59,999. However, $10,000 must be spent to cover the transac-
tion costs, thereby reducing the amount left for actual purchase to $49,999. The author will not sell for 
this price. 
94. Remember, the cartoonist can still reaIize a $50,000 profit on his own. 
95. The author's $50,000 profit is less than the $50,001 or more the studio would have paid him if 
there had been no transaction costs. 
96. See A.M. POLINSKY, supra note 25, at 10 (a standard assumption of economic analysis that is 
made in analyzing the efficiency of legal rules provides that "all benefits and costs can be measured in 
terms of a common denominator-dollars") This customary reduction is critically discussed in Ge-
orgescu-Roegen, supra note 83, at 10-522. See also M. LUTZ & K. Lux, supra note 80, at 59-75, 317-
22. 
97. A.M. POLINSKY, supra note 25, at 10. 
98. See R. POSNER, supra note 28, at 60 ("[t]he most important thing to bear in mind about the 
concept of value is that it is based on what people are willing to pay for something rather than on the 
happiness they would derive from having it"). See also infra note 100. 
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"losers" and still·improve their welfare,99 the economist recommends 
that the change be made. 1OO The economist need not worry about 
whether the compensation is actually paid because of the assumption 
that government can costlessly make the necessary cash transfers from 
the winners to the losers. 101 This process can continue until no 
Kaldor-Hicks superior moves remain. 102 
99. It is important to remember that the proposed monetary compensation must be completely 
satisfactory to the "losers" if the Kaldor-Hicks criterion is to be correctly applied. As noted previously, 
Pareto efficiency corresponds to a social optimum because it is the result of voluntary individual trans-
actions. See supra notes 87-91 and accompanying text. Since the Kaldor-Hicks criterion identifies 
potential Pareto improvements, it follows that the "winners" in any Kaldor-Hicks change must be able 
to pay the "losers" an amount which converts the change to a Pareto improvement. This can happen 
only if the payment is one that the "losers" would accept voluntarily. See supra notes 82, 84 (equating 
Kaldor-Hicks improvement with potential Pareto improvement and noting importance of subjective 
preferences). See also infra note 100. 
100. This entire analytical process has been clearly expressed by economist E.l. Mishan: 
Since we are committed to the concept of a potential Pareto improvement, we must allow 
ourselves to be guided by its implications. The notion of an economic event, or reorganiza-
tion, that can make everyone better off'requires that we use the ev concept only. [Profes-
sor Mishan defines the ev concept as the sum that maintains welfare at the original level 
when an economic event occurs). 
To be more explicit, all those affected by the economic event can be divided into gain-
ers and losers. Irrespective of which law is operative, the ev of each of the gainers is the 
maximum sum he is willing to pay for the event. The ev of e&ch of the losers, on the other 
hand, is the minimum sum he can be made to accept to put up with the event in question. 
If, then, with respect to some specific economic event, the maximum sums the gainers are 
prepared to pay (treated as a positive magnitude) exceed the minimum sums acceptable to 
the losers (treated as a negative magnitude), the algebraic sum of the evs will be positive, 
and, by definition, a potential Pareto improvement will have been realized by the event. 
E.l. MISHAN, CoST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS 137 (1976) (emphasis in original). 
101. See supra note 97 and accompanying text. 
102. Alternatively, the economist may use mathematical techniques to maximize society's wealth. 
Since all values are expressed in terms of dollars, the economist constructs an individual utility function 
for each member of society. This function expresses the individual's subjective dollar valuation of his or 
her unique bundle of assets. Once this has been accomplished, society's welfare may be expressed as a 
function (often the sum) of the individual utility functions. This leads to the expression of social wel-
fare in terms of each individual's distribution of resources. A series of calculations then leads to the 
mathematical expression of the precise allocation of resources that maximizes society's wealth. See H. 
VARIAN, supra note 24, at 149-54; Tribe, Policy Science: Analysis or Ideology?, 2 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 66, 
68-73 (1972). This is normally done by solving for the allocation at which the marginal rates ofsubsti-
tution between each pair of goods is equal. H. VARIAN, supra at 152; Tribe, supra at 69 n.7. 
Conceptually, these techniques are the same. If no more moves can be made such that the benefits 
outweigh the costs, then social welfare cannot be improved. This article uses the compensation tech-
nique because it is more widely used by legal analysts and because application of mathematical tech-
niques necessary is practically impossible. 
It should also be noted that the presentation of efficiency theory here and elsewhere in this article 
should not be perceived as an unqualified endorsement of efficiency analysis in copyright or law more 
generally. Instead, efficiency is presented here in order to test its ability to explain parody's fair use 
treatment. See supra notes 5, 21-34 and accompanying text. 
It certainly is possible to construct arguments which support the efficient production of wealth as 
the sole criterion for evaluating law. See R. POSNER, supra note 28. However, these arguments are 
subject to convincing criticism. First, although wealth is certainly valued by society, it is not the only 
thing that society desires. Thus, arranging social affairs by sole reference to the efficient production of 
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The foregoing suggests a method by which a court could use the 
fair use doctrine to promote Pareto efficiency. First, a court should 
presumptively enforce an author's proprietary rights as defined by the 
copyright statute. Second, the court should only consider a fair use 
defense if it can identify a failure of perfect market conditions. Third, 
the court should declare the use fair (i.e. permit the borrowing) only if 
society's gains through fair use outweigh any losses imposed on au-
thors. l03 The possibility of using efficiency to explain copyright intui-
tion may therefore be tested by examining the correspondence between 
this analysis and the traditional analysis constructed in the previous 
section. 
B. The Efficiency Explanation of Parody as Fair Use 
Our analysis begins on a promising note, for the intuitive cost-
benefit treatment of parody bears strong similarities to the first step of 
the Pareto efficiency approach. As noted previously, courts initially 
ruled that parodies infringed the rights of the copyright holder. 104 
Thus, parodists were presumptively forced to buy rights from authors 
like any other derivative work user. lOS This result conforms to the 
basic presumption that voluntary exchange promotes Pareto efficiency 
and leads to a social optimum. 
Of cOurse, courts eventually changed this status quo in favor of a 
wealth rests on the dubious proposition that such efforts necessarily lead to all other goods that society 
desires. See Dworkin, Is Wealth a Value', 91. LEGAL STUD. 191 (1980); 1. CoLEMAN, supra note 3, at 
112 ("If .the pursuit of wealth is a good, it must be because pursuing wealth promotes other things of 
value. "). This ethical criticism is echoed by economists who argue against the ordering of society solely 
upon efficiency considerations. See E.l. MISHAN, THE EcONOMIC GROWTH DEBATE 36 (1977) 
("(W]ho doubts that the wealthier and economically more efficient society can also be the less healthy, 
the less honest, the less secure and the less contented?"); Rizzo, The Mirage of Efficiency, 8 HOfSTRA 
L. REv. 641, 646 (1980) (pointing out that markets poorly relIect the value of moralisms). 
Second, even if one accepts the notion that the blind pursuit of wealth is an ethically acceptable 
way to order society, economic theory itself offers numerous reasons to take recommendations based 
solely on efficiency with a grain of salt. As an initial matter, the efficiency analyst seldom, if ever, 
obtains all the information necessary to unambiguously and completely measure society's wealth. In 
these situations a rule which appears to make one sector of the economy efficient may well reduce social 
welfare overall. See Rizzo, supra at 6S2-S3 (describing the problem of second best), E.l. MISHAN, supra 
note 100, at 98-101. Moreover, the economist sometimes becomes trapped in a never ending cycle of 
conflicting recommendations. See Scitovsz1ty, A Note on Welfare Propositions in Economics, 9 REv. 
EcoN. STUD. 77 (1941) (outlining the so-called "Scitovskzy paradox"); E.l. MISHAN, supra note 100, at 
140-41, 398-401 (discussing wealth effects). These conflicts show that society could not completely 
order itself on economics even if it wanted to. 
A detailed examination of these issues is beyond the scope of this article. However, it is worth 
noting that. these criticisms cast doubt upon whether economics can ever provide a complete theory of 
copyright law. See Yen, supra note S, at S44-46. 
103. See Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure, supra note S. 
104. See supra note 44. 
lOS. See supra note 43 and accompanying text. 
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rule that allows a parodist to borrow more from a work than is gener-
ally contemplated under copyright law. 106 This development rested 
upon the observation that parody was valuable "both as entertainment 
and as a form of social and literary criticism." 107 Courts paid special 
attention to this fact because it implied that the fair use treatment of 
parody would advance social welfare in a special and unique way. lOS 
This allowed courts to distinguish parody from other types of deriva-
tive uses that were undeserving of fair use treatment and set the stage 
for the intuitive cost-benefit analysis at the heart of the fair use doc-
trine. Interestingly, parody's unique social value also suggests that the 
economist's basic presumption about voluntary exchange may not be 
justified. Application of the fair use doctrine to parodies therefore 
seems economically plausible. 
As noted earlier, the economist generally assumes that individu-
als who want to create derivative works will raise sufficient money to 
buy the necessary rights from the author as long as those rights are 
more valuable in the borrower's hands than in the author's.I09 This 
assumption seems particularly strong when commercial exploitation of 
the underlying work is involved because the public generally indicates 
its estimation of the derivative work's value by the price that the pub-
lic is willing to pay to see the derivative work. 110 However, a success-
ful parody does more than merely entertain. It also gives its 
consumers a humorous and critical perspective on both the work being 
parodied and society at large. The strength of this contribution in-
creases as more people view the parody, and it is difficult, if not impos-
sible, to achieve this through any other art form. To the extent that 
social opinions change as a result of this proCess, even those who did 
not view the parody benefit from its existence. Society thereby reaps a 
tangible benefit by having a more educated and intellectually active 
citizenry. 111 
This tangible but diffuse benefit associated with parody violates 
the general assumption that a derivative work's social value is reflected 
in the price the public is willing to pay to see the work. 112 Parodists 
106. See supra notes 44,47 and accompanying text. 
107. Berlin v. E.C. Publications, Inc., 329 F.2d 541, 545 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 822 
(1964). 
108. See supra note 66 and accompanying text. 
109. See supra notes 88-91 and accompanying text. 
110. [d. 
111. See supra note 66 and accompanying text. 
112. Economically sophisticated readers will recognize this as a failure of the no-extemality con-
dition. In this situation an external benefit exists because parodists are unable to capture the entire 
social benefit of their work in the price they realize upon its sale. See supra note 86. Some commenta-
tors have explained the market failure associated with parody as one of imPerfect information. Under 
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sell and consumers buy parodies primarily for their entertainment 
value. 113 Only rarely will someone buy a parody expressly for its criti-
cism of the work being parodied. Furthermore, consumers probably 
never buy parodies because they want to subsidize the education of the 
citizenry at large. Thus, the money a parodist can offer an author for 
the purchase of parody rights is likely to understate the true social 
value of his work.114 Since the true social value of parody is not re-
flected in the price paid for parodies, the unregulated market cannot 
be presumptively Pareto efficient. The economist would therefore no 
longer necessarily enforce the status quo, for there can be no assurance 
that the market allocates parody rights in a socially optimal fashion. lIS 
This explains why an economist would agree with the judicial decision 
to consider fair use treatment for those parodies that have value as 
literary criticism. I 16 
The failure of the parody market's presumptive efficiency leads 
the economist to perform a cost-benefit calculation to see if the status 
quo should be changed under the Kaldor-Hicks criterion. As the 
reader will recall, the heart of the Kaldor-Hicks analysis is that a pro-
posed change in the status quo promotes efficiency only if the gains of 
the winners are sufficient to compensate the losers.117 In the case of 
parody as fair use, the "winners" are parodists and the members of 
society who benefit from the criticism associated with parody. Their 
gain may be expressed as the money paid to parodists by consumers 
this view, parody is seen as a form of book review, thereby helping consumers decide which works to 
buy. See Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure, supra note S, at 1634. Although this is plausible, I do 
not find it convincing because consumers of parodies find them useful after viewing the original, not 
before. Thus, while parody does affect consumer taste, the notion that it plays a significant role in the 
commercial success or failure of a given work seems a bit far·fetched. Rather, as stated in the text, its 
value is in a broader humorous perspective and commentary. 
In. See supra note 42 (listing cases in which parody is widely disseminated as entertainment). 
114. See Gordon, supra note 26, at 1042 (noting that critics rarely capture the social value of their 
work in the price they receive). 
liS. See supra notes 92-9S- and accompanying text. The foregoing also explains why an econo-
mist would support judicial refusals to apply the parody defense to works whose value lies strictly in its 
humor. For example, in Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc. v. Showcase Atlanta Coop. Prods., Inc., 479 F. 
Supp. 3S1 (N.D. Ga. 1979), the Northern District of Georgia considered a copyright suit by the owners 
of Gone with the Wind against the producers of Scarlett Fever, a three hour play which humorously 
followed the Gone with the Wind plot. Id. at 3S4-SS. Although the defendants claimed that Scarlett 
Fever was a parody of Gone with the Wind, the court imposed a preliminary injunction in the plaintiffs' 
favor. In so ruling, the court noted that "the work as a whole is not a critical commentary on either the 
film or the novel Gone with the Wind." Id. at 3S7. From an efficiency perspective, this decision was 
correct. Since Scarlett Fever contained no criticism of the underlying original, it was socially valuable 
primarily as entertainment. Thus, its market price probably reflected accurately its contribution to 
public welfare. Forcing the defendants to purchase derivative works rights from the owners of Gone 
with the Wind would therefore encourage the efficient allocation of resources. 
116. See supra note 4S. 
117. See supra note 82 and accompanying text. 
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plus the diffuse benefit society gets from parody's criticism.ll8 This 
amount must be compared against the authors' losses, which may be 
expressed as the money value of their lost chance of licensing parodies 
plus any emotional or reputational harm suffered as a result of par-
ody's ridicule. 119 A comparison of this analysis and the traditional 
reasoning that supports parody as a fair use reveals some important 
similarities and differences. 
The traditional cost-benefit reasoning that supports parody's fair 
use status involved the intuitive evaluation of three items. On one 
hand, the courts considered the "gains" associated with parody's value 
as entertainment and as criticism. 120 On the other hand, the courts 
considered any "losses" inflicted by parodists on authors by reason of 
lost sales of the authors' works.121 The courts then made sure that the 
gains outweighed the losses by allowing fair use only when parody's 
value as entertainment and criticism were high and the authors' lost 
sales were low. 122 
At first blush, it might appear that this intuitive cost-benefit anal-
ysis may be directly translated into an efficiency calculation. Closer 
inspection, however, reveals that this is not the case, for the economist 
performing a Kaldor-Hicks analysis evaluates four, and not three, 
items. Like the traditional analyst, the efficiency theorist considers 
parody's value as entertainment, its value as criticism, and the lost 
sales of the author. However, the efficiency theorist also must con-
sider the losses parody's ridicule inflicts upon authors. This addition 
is required because the economist deals only with the subjective desires 
of the individual. 123 In the case of parody, it is the author's desire to 
avoid ridicule that is generally responsible for her reluctance to sell 
rights to parodists. Forcing authors to endure the criticism of parody 
without compensation therefore imposes a loss on authors. Failure to 
account for such harm is fundamentally inconsistent with the pursuit 
of Pareto efficiency. 
The addition of the author'S emotional loss in the Kaldor-Hicks 
efficiency calculation raises considerable doubt about whether par-
ody's fair use treatment is efficient at all. As the reader will recall, the 
118. Normally, the purchase price of a work reflects its social value. In this case, however, one 
must also take into account the value of parody that is not reflected in its price because of market 
failure. See supra note 86 and accompanying text. 
119. As noted previously, parody's fair use treatment inflicts· two possible hanns on authors. 
First, authors lose their ability to exploit their works through parody themselves. Second, they are 
directly hanned by the ridicule of parody. See supra note 56 and accompanying text. 
120. See supra notes 57·67 and accompanying text. 
121. See supra notes 68·75 and accompanying text. 
122. See supra notes 76-79 and accompanying text. 
123. See supra note 84 and accompanying text. 
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Kaldor-Hicks test allows the fair use treatment of p~rody only if soci-
ety gains more than authors lose. 124 Under a traditional intuitive anal-
ysis, it seems that this is the case because the conventional analyst 
ignores any non-pecuniary or emotional losses that parody inflicts on 
authors. The gains from parody are tangible, and authors lose few, if 
any, of the financial incentives which encourage their work.125 How-
ever, an economist applying the Kaldor-Hicks test must compare the 
gains from parody against the authors' desire to be left free of parody's 
critical bite. This comparison would normally be performed by deter-
mining if the gains of society (the winners) were large enough to pay 
authors (the losers) subjectively adequate compensation. 126 This com-
parison has two possible outcomes with radically different conse-
quences for an efficiency explanation for parody. 
One possibility is that authors do not sell parody rights because 
parodists are unable to raise enough money to successfully bribe the 
author. If this were the case, then efficiency would remain a plausible 
explanation for parody's fair use treatment. If the courts attached a 
high enough dollar value to society's gains from parody, they would 
correctly determine that, under perfect conditions, parodists would be 
able to offer sufficient bribes to buy the necessary rights from au-
thors. 127 When coupled with the assumption of costless compensa-
tion, fair use treatment for parody would then promote Pareto 
efficiency. 128 
The second possibility is that authors are simply unwilling to sell 
parody rights for any sum. This would occur if authors valued their 
emotional tranquility in a manner similar to their limbs. Thus, an au-
thor who is offered a large sum of money for her parody rights would 
respond in the same way that she would if offered a large sum of 
money for her legs. She would simply state, "They are not for 
sale."129 If this turns out to be the case, the fair use treatment of par-
ody can no longer be described as promoting Pareto efficiency. This is 
because a proposed change in the status quo is Pareto efficient only if 
124. See supra note 82 and accompanying text. 
125. See supra notes 78-79 and accompanying text. 
126. See supra notes 82, 99-101 and accompanying text. 
127. If sale of parodies did not generate any external benefits, then parodists would be able to 
charge society the entire amount society is willing to pay for access to parody. 
128. Since society's gains are large enough to generate compensation for parodists, the court or-
ders the fair use treatment of parody under the Kaldor-Hicks criterion. Although this change inflicts a 
loss upon the author, the general assumption that compensation will be paid turns a Kaldor-Hicks 
improvement into a Pareto improvement. See supra notes 99-101 and accompanying text. 
129. This sort of preference structure is an example of lexicographic, or lexical, ordering. Lexical 
ordering occurs when an individual values good A in such a way that she will not accept good B as a 
substitute, no matter how much of good B she can have instead of good A. Harrison, Egoism. Altruism. 
and Market Illusions: The Limits 0/ Law and Economics, 33 UCLA 1. REv. 1309, 1328 (1986); Tribe, 
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all members in society are SUbjectively as well as or better off than they 
were before the change. 130 If authors are forced to endure the barbs of 
parodists with no hope of compensation other than money, they will 
be subjectively worse off because they never wanted to sell rights to 
parodists at any price. 
The foregoing analysis shows that the plausibility of the efficiency 
explanation for parody's fair use treatment boils down to an empirical 
question: Do authors subjectively prefer a certain sum of money to 
freedom from the emotional stress caused by parodies? Unfortunately 
for efficiency theorists, intuition and empirical evidence strongly sug-
gest-that the answer is "No." 
The intuitive evidence comes from the traditional justification for 
parody's fair use treatment. Authors, like all individuals, do not like 
to be ridiculed. Given the fact that a person's reputation or emotional 
supra note 102, at 90; Georgescu·Roegen, supra note 83, at S10018; M. LUTZ & K. Lux, supra note 80, 
at 68-7S, 317-26. 
The possibility of lexical ordering is important because efficiency theorists have always assumed 
that people will not value dilferent goods in this way. By assuming that all value can be expressed in 
terms of money, economists construct a world where individuals will accept money as a substitute for 
any loss they may suffer. Brief reflection shows that the nonexistence of lexical ordering is the very 
linchpin of efficiency analysis. 
For example, the Kaldor-Hicks criterion rests on the notion that the payment of some amount of 
money compensates for any loss imposed on individuals in the name of efficiency. As long as individu-
als in fact consider money an adequate substitute for their losses, any Kaldor-Hicks superior move can 
be transformed into a Pareto superior move by the payment of money. See supra notes 99-101. How-
ever, if individuals value certain goods as lexically prior to money, the likelihood of promoting Pareto 
efficiency through the Kaldor-Hicks criterion diminishes tremendously. 
Consider a situation in which the efficiency analyst is trying to decide whether to order construc-
tion of a dam which will flood A's property. Under a Kaldor-Hicks analysis, the dam should be built if 
the dollar value of the dam's benefits yields enough money to induce A to sell his property voluntarily. 
If A in fact values his property in money terms, the Kaldor-Hicks analysis provides a plausible yard-
stick for measuring the relative social value ofthe dam and A's property. However, if A refuses to sell 
at any price, (perhaps because the land is the traditional home of his family), any money oriented cost-
benefit analysis which supports construction of the dam cannot promote Pareto efficiency. Since A will 
not accept money as compensation for his property, any forced flooding of A's land inflicts an uncom-
pensated loss on A which cannot be squared with Pareto criterion's underpinnings in consent. 
The effect of lexical ordering on the mathematical maximization of social welfare is even more 
striking. If individuals express their preferences in a lexically ordered fashion, a fundamental assump-
tion which makes mathematical calculation of the welfare maximum possible is no longer true. In 
particular, economists assume that individual preferences may be expressed as continuous functions. 
This assumption is necessary to ensure that calculation of marginal rates of substitution proceeds 
smoothly. H. VARIAN, supra note 24, at 81; Tribe, supra note 102, at 69. However, if lexical ordering 
appears, the requirement of continuity is violated. H. VARIAN, supra, at 83-4. Once this occurs, the 
entire process of calculating a social welfare maximum fails. Tribe, supra, at 93 ("as long as both 
individual and societal preference orderings display this sort of 'lumpiness,' the entire scheme of as-
signing rights and liabilities so as to maximize efficiency, while using transfers of income to smooth out 
the distribution of wealth conceived as a homogeneous good, is doomed to failure"). As we shall see, 
these very problems interfere with any attempt to defend parody's fair use treatment as efficient. See 
infra notes 131-138 and accompanying text. 
130. See supra notes 80-81 and accompanying text. 
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tranquility cannot be restored with money once it h1lS been destroyed, 
the chance that an author (or any individual) would allow the destruc-
tion of those things via parody is very slim. 131 
The empirical evidence comes from work done in the context of 
libel actions by Professors Bezanson, Soloski 'and Cranberg. 132 In 
their work, these scholars surveyed 164 plaintiffs in libel cases. 133 
Among other things, the victims were asked how the libel had harmed 
them, what the media could have done to satisfy the plaintiffs' griev-
ances, and what the plaintiffs asked the media to do. 134 
Not surprisingly, most plaintiffs claimed that libel had harmed 
them emotionally, financially, or both. 13!! More importantly, the 
plaintiffs overwhelmingly stated that they did not consider money 
damages an adequate remedy for the harm they had suffered. 136 
72.9% stated that an apology or a retraction would suffice, while an-
other 20% indicated that nothing at all would suffice. This trend was 
reflected in the demands the plaintiffs made to the media as well. Only 
0.8% of the plaintiffs requested money damages, while 79.7% asked 
for retractions, apologies, or corrections. 137 These statistics shed a 
good deal of light on the possibility of using efficiency to explain par-
ody's fair use treatment. 
In particular, the questions posed to the libel plaintiffs address 
issues that are similar to those involved in a copyright action against a 
parodist. A libel victim sues because statements made to the public 
portray the victim in an unflattering light. The victim suffers through 
the ridicule and scorn heaped upon him by those who have seen the 
13\. See Gordon, supra note 26, at 1043 ("[w)hen goods as important and irreplaceable as life or 
reputation are on the table persons are unlikely to sell what they own at any price"). See also Fisher v. 
Dees, 794 F.2d 432, 437 (9th Cir. 1986) ("[s)elf-esteem is seldom strong enough to permit the granting 
of permission [to a parodist) even in exchange for a reasonable fee"); Post, The Social Foundations of 
Defamation Law: Reputation and the Constitution, 74 CALIF. L. REv. 691, 707 (\986) (basing reputa-
tion on the "essential dignity and worth of every human being"); R. BEZANSON, J. SOLOSKI, & G. 
CRANBERG, LIBEL LAW AND THE PRESS 1 (\987) ("[a) person's good name is priceless") (emphasis in 
original). This intuition is further confirmed by the observation that parodies became rather scarce in 
the wake of Judge Carter's original decision in Loew's. Netterville, supra note 1, at 237 ("[n)o one can 
deny that since the [Loew'sJ decision, parody and burlesque involving copyrighted works have all but 
disappeared from the major medium for communication in the United States today-the television 
screen"). 
132. R. BEZANSON, J. SOLOSKI, & G. GRANBERG, supra note 13\. 
133. Id. at 7. 
134. Id. at 19-28. 
135. Id. at 21-22. It is worth remarking that survey evidence cannot be considered conclusive, for 
the things people say may well be different from what they actually think. Nevertheless, the survey 
evidence presented here is certainly evidence of whether people consider money an adequate substitute 
for harm to their reputation and emotional tranquility. 
136. Id. at 23-28. 
137. Id. at 26. 
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libelous statement. Similarly, an author sues a parodist because she 
resents the public portrayal of her work in an unflattering light. She 
suffers because those who have seen the parody hold her in lower es-
teem and laugh at her work. These similarities indicate that the an-
swers given by libel plaintiffs are good evidence of how authors value 
their reputation and emotional tranquility against money. The statis-
tics show that the overwhelming majority of those injured through 
criticism simply do not think that money compensates them for their 
losses. Indeed, the fact that 20% of the libel plaintiffs believed that no 
satisfactory remedy existed suggests that authors might never be sub-
jectively compensated for the losses they suffer at the hands of paro-
dists. This in tum makes it difficult, if not impossible, for an 
economist to defend parody's fair use treatment as efficient. 138 
IV. CONCLUSION 
As the reader will recall, the power of efficiency analysis stemmed 
primarily from a single assumption, the reduction of value to 
money.139 This assumption was important because it gave the effi-
ciency analyst a single scale by which to measure the consequences of 
changing any status quo. In the context of parody, this assumption 
failed, and it became the reason that the article failed to construct an 
efficiency explanation for parody. This can best be seen by examining 
again the differences between the traditional and efficiency approaches 
to the parody question. 
The traditional explanation for parody's fair use treatment rested 
in large part on the courts' refusal to count the harm of criticism on 
the author's emotional welfare in its intuitive cost-benefit analysis. l40 
By contrast, the efficiency analyst was forced to take this harm into 
account. If authors had valued this emotional harm in terms of 
money, the construction of an efficiency explanation for parody's fair 
use treatment might well have been successful. Even though the au-
thor would have placed a high monetary value on her emotional tran-
quility, it is entirely possible that society would have valued its access 
to parody even more highly. Treating parody as a fair use would have 
been acceptable under the Kaldor-Hicks principle, for the efficiency 
theorist was entitled to assume that the money transfer needed to pro-
mote Pareto efficiency would be costlessly made. 141 
138. The authors' apparent refusal to accept money as a substitute for reputation and emotional 
tranquility has devastating effects on the mathematical calculation of social welfare as well. See supra 
note 129. 
139. See supra notes 96-98. 
140. See supra note 56. 
141. See supra notes 127-128 and accompanying text. 
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Of course, it appears that authors did not vallie their emotional 
tranquility in terms of money. Since authors were apparently unwill-
ing to sell their parody rights at any price, no sum of money could ever 
properly compensate the author for any losses suffered at the hands of 
parodists. This failure of compensation made justifying parody's fair 
use treatment under the Kaldor-Hicks criterion impossible. 142 
On a more general level, the foregoing suggests that future at-
tempts to construct efficiency explanations for copyright doctrine are 
likely to fail whenever authors value their copyright rights for non-
monetary reasons. In these situations, authors will consistently refuse 
to sell others the rights to use their works because money will not be 
an adequate substitute for any interests harmed by the contemplated 
use. For example, individuals sometimes use copyright to hinder biog-
raphers' use of their writings. This may be done because the biogra-
pher is hostile. 143 Other times the author may simply want privacy.l44 
Similarly, an artist might sue those who use their works because they 
object to the defendants' alteration of the original artistic message, and 
not because they intend to exploit the work in the same manner them-
selves. 14s To the extent that courts have decided cases like these in 
favor of the defendants, the author's refusal to exchange her interest 
for money makes it impossible for the efficiency analyst to explain the 
result. 
The importance of this for future copyright analysis is clear. No 
matter how hard we try, a complete efficiency explanation of copyright 
is unlikely because authors sometimes do not consider money an ade-
quate substitute for their copyright rights. We must therefore develop 
non-efficiency copyright theories and apply them to explain at least 
some of copyright's intuitively supported results. This sort of inquiry 
leads in two possible directions. One possibility is that analysts will 
clearly identify the various considerations that make up copyright in-
tuition. Once this has happened, the relative importance of these fac-
tors can be established. Efforts such as these will hopefully make 
142. See supra notes 129-138 and accompanying text. 
143. See New Era Publications, Int'l, ApS v. Carol Publishing Group, 904 F.2d 152 (2d Cir. 
1990) (copyright suit against author who had written a critical biography of L. Ron Hubbard and the 
Church of Scientology). 
144. See Salinger v. Random House, Inc., 811 F.2d 90 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 890 (1987); 
Craft v. Kobler, 667 F. Supp. 120 (S.D.N.Y. 1987). 
145. Cf, Gilliam v. American Broadcasting Co., 538 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1976) (suit under Copyright 
and Lanham Acts to enjoin defendant's broadcasting an edited version of Monty Python'S Flying Circus 
television program); Gordon, supra note 26, at \033 ("[tJhe author of a new work is unlikely to obtain 
permission from a prior author if he wishes to criticize the work or use the prior author's material in a 
way that rejects or undercuts the meaning the predecessor meant to invest in her materials or 
symbols"). 
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copyright intuition more predictable. 146 
Second, and perhaps more importantly, analysts might look to 
non-utilitarian theories of property for a different perspective on how 
far an author's copyright rights should extend. As this article has· 
shown, efficiency's failure to explain certain facets of copyright law 
stems from its assumption that all preferences are equally worthy of 
legal protection. Those preferences may be violated only if subjec-
tively adequate compensation is actually or theoretically given to the 
"loser." Since authors apparently do not always prefer money to cer-
tain fair use treatment of their works, this leaves the efficiency analyst 
without an adequate explanation for why copyright grants such fair 
use treatment anyway. By contrast, non-utilitarian theories based on 
individual rights may succeed where efficiency fails because they do 
not necessarily assume that all preferences are equally worthy of legal 
protection. These theories could therefore explain copyright's fair use 
treatment of works such as parody by directly evaluating whether the 
interests at stake fall within the definition of individual rights found in 
natural law, personality theory, or constitutional law. 147 
Of course, there is no guarantee that any of these efforts will ulti-
mately provide a comprehensive theory of copyright. However, since 
we now know that copyright cannot be totally explained through effi-
ciency, we also know that at least part of copyright's future rests in 
these relatively unexplored areas. 
146. See Dratier, supra note 5 I (examining and clarifying factors relevant to fair use analysis); 
Leva!, supra note 52 (advocating the resolution of fair use ambiguity by further attention to copyright's 
basic principles). 
147. Indeed, courts and commentators have suggested non-utilitarian theories for why the intui-
tive cost-benefit explanation for parody's fair use treatment ignores any harm to an authors' emotions 
or reputation. From a constitutional perspective, some analysts have suggested that the parodist's right 
of free expression is simply greater than the author's right to be free of ridicule. See Goetsch, supra 
note I; B. KAPLAN, supra note 56, at 69. This constitutional position may also reflect society'S belief 
that ridicule is simply a fair and just consequence of an author's fame. See MCA, Inc. v. Wilson, 677 
F.2d 180, 191 (2d Cir. 1980) ("permissible parody, whether or not in good taste, is the price an artist 
pays for success, just as a public figure must tolerate more persona! attack than the average private 
citizen") (Mansfield, J., dissenting). 
